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Using new data on the term in office of central bank governors for a large set of countries for 1970-2005, we estimate a model for the probability that a central bank governor is replaced before the end of his legal term in office...
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Using new data on the term in office of central bank governors for a large set of countries for 1970-2005, we estimate a model for the probability that a central bank governor is replaced before the end of his legal term in office. We formulate hypotheses based on the literature on the determinants of central bank independence that are tested using conditional logit models and the robustness approach of Sala-i-Martin (1997). We conclude that, apart from the share of the legal term in office that haselapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and the ratio of private credit to GDP increase the probability of a turnover.
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This paper examines whether weak central bank finances affect inflation by scrutinizing the key rationale for such a relationship: that the absence of Treasury support makes central bank finances relevant for price stability. Spec...
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This paper examines whether weak central bank finances affect inflation by scrutinizing the key rationale for such a relationship: that the absence of Treasury support makes central bank finances relevant for price stability. Specifically, I ask whether central banks which are not likely to enjoy fiscal support when needed experience higher inflation as their financial situation deteriorates. I find this to be true among a large sample of 82 countries between 1998 and 2008. De facto potential fiscal support appears relevant, while de jure fiscal support, which I survey analyzing 82 central bank laws, does not appear to matter. The results also bring forward an explanation for the conflicting results of the previous empirical studies, which neglected this key component.
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This article examines how addressing climate-related risks and supporting mitigation and adaptation policies fit into central bank mandates. We conduct an analysis of mandates and objectives using the IMF?s Central Bank Legislatio...
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This article examines how addressing climate-related risks and supporting mitigation and adaptation policies fit into central bank mandates. We conduct an analysis of mandates and objectives using the IMF?s Central Bank Legislation Database and compare these to sustainability-related policies central banks have adopted in practice. Out of 135 central banks, only 12% have explicit sustainability mandates, while 40% are mandated to support the government?s policy priorities, which mostly include sustainability goals. However, given that climate risks can directly affect central banks? traditional core responsibilities, all institutions ought to incorporate climaterelated physical and transition risks into their policy frameworks to safeguard macro-financial stability.
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The recent banking crisis has opened up the discourse about central banking. The purpose here is to revisit the principles of central banking and the theoretical framework for applying them in light of these changed conditions. We...
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The recent banking crisis has opened up the discourse about central banking. The purpose here is to revisit the principles of central banking and the theoretical framework for applying them in light of these changed conditions. We focus on different understandings of the economic process and how they relate to the principles of central banking, comparing the dominant technocratic approach to central banking theory with a more traditional political economy approach. We consider the recent use of 'unconventional' tools of monetary policy and a range of current proposals for reform of money, banking and central banking. It is argued that central banking needs a new framework which recognises the interdependencies between the conditions for monetary stability, financial stability and economic stability and between the policy measures by which these goals may be addressed.
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This paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries for 1970-2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank governor is replaced in a particular year is positively ...
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This paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries for 1970-2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank governor is replaced in a particular year is positively related to the share of the term in office elapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation. The latter result suggests that the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is a poor indicator of central bank independence. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation in which TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account.
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This article puts the independence of central banks into historical perspective. In doing so, it underlines the highly versatile nature of the balance of forces between central banks and governments. From this viewpoint, the situa...
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This article puts the independence of central banks into historical perspective. In doing so, it underlines the highly versatile nature of the balance of forces between central banks and governments. From this viewpoint, the situation of public finances emerges as a key explanatory factor, and an analysis of the sequence of central banking models is proposed from the late 19th century to the present day. The article upholds the thesis of the emergence, since the subprime crisis, of a new model qualified as "tacit low-degree independence": central banks have, of their own volition, given up some of their de facto independence, helping governments to contain the rise in national debt But while keeping a step ahead of pressure from governments, they have lost the control of money supply. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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In this paper we confirm the hypothesis that central bank independence reforms reduce the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. However, the strength of this effect depends on the rule of law and the degree of ...
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In this paper we confirm the hypothesis that central bank independence reforms reduce the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. However, the strength of this effect depends on the rule of law and the degree of political polarization.
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We investigate the link between ideology and the sentiments of parliamentarians when they speak to the central bank they hold accountable. To this end, we collect textual data on the quarterly hearings of the ECB President before ...
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We investigate the link between ideology and the sentiments of parliamentarians when they speak to the central bank they hold accountable. To this end, we collect textual data on the quarterly hearings of the ECB President before the European Parliament from 1999 to 2019. We apply sentiment analysis to more than 1900 speeches of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 128 parties. We find robust evidence that MEPs' sentiments towards the ECB are correlated with the ideological stance predominantly on a pro-/anti-European dimension rather than on a left-right dimension.
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With central banks looming larger in the public consciousness in the wake of the great recession of 2008, perhaps more attention than ever is being paid to central banks and their activities. So far as I am aware, this Encyclopedi...
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With central banks looming larger in the public consciousness in the wake of the great recession of 2008, perhaps more attention than ever is being paid to central banks and their activities. So far as I am aware, this Encyclopedia breaks new ground in being the first devoted exclusively to central banking, defined in the book's introduction as "the variety of policy targets, strategies and instruments used by monetary authorities all around the world". The Encyclopedia does not eschew, though, pertinent theories and concepts. It succeeds in its aim of being "a voluminous, but synthetic work".
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This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on central bank independence, which at the time re...
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This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on central bank independence, which at the time represented a German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to conventional wisdom, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and Ordoliberalism are identified. JEL Classification Codes: B22, B31, E50
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